Artificial Intelligence versus Maya Angelou: Experimental evidence that
  people cannot differentiate AI-generated from human-written poetry by Köbis, Nils & Mossink, Luca
 Creative Artificial Intelligence –  
Algorithms vs. humans in an incentivized writing competition 
Nils C. Köbis* & Luca D. Mossink 
Department of Economics & Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision making 
(CREED), University of Amsterdam 
 
 
 
 
 
* Correspondence: Nils C. Köbis (n.c.kobis@gmail.com), Center for Research in Experimental 
Economics and Political Decision Making, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands.  
Funding: This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreements: 
ERC-StG-637915; ERC-AdG 295707) from Research Priority Area Behavioral Economics 
(University of Amsterdam, proposal number 201906250406).  
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they do not have any conflict of interests.  
 
 
CREATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE  2 
Abstract 
The release of openly available, robust text generation algorithms has spurred much public 
attention and debate, due to algorithm’s purported ability to generate human-like text across 
various domains. Yet, empirical evidence using incentivized tasks to assess human behavioral 
reactions to such algorithms is lacking. We conducted two experiments assessing behavioral 
reactions to the state-of-the-art Natural Language Generation algorithm GPT-2 (Ntotal = 830). 
Using the identical starting lines of human poems, GPT-2 produced samples of multiple 
algorithmically-generated poems. From these samples, either a random poem was chosen 
(Human-out-of-the-loop) or the best one was selected (Human-in-the-loop) and in turn matched 
with a human written poem. Taking part in a new incentivized version of the Turing Test, 
participants failed to reliably detect the algorithmically-generated poems in the human-in-the-
loop treatment, yet succeeded in the Human-out-of-the-loop treatment. Further, the results reveal 
a general aversion towards algorithmic poetry, independent on whether participants were 
informed about the algorithmic origin of the poem (Transparency) or not (Opacity). We discuss 
what these results convey about the performance of NLG algorithms to produce human-like text 
and propose methodologies to study such learning algorithms in experimental settings. 
Keywords: Natural Language Generation; Computational Creativity; Turing Test; Creativity; 
Machine Behavior 
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Creative Artificial Intelligence – Algorithms vs. humans in an incentivized writing competition 
Artificial intelligence (AI), “the development of machines capable of sophisticated 
(intelligent) information processing” (Dafoe, 2018, p. 5) is rapidly advancing and has begun to 
take over tasks previously solely performed by humans (Rahwan et al., 2019). Algorithms have 
also begun to assist humans in writing text, such as autocompleting sentences in emails and even 
helping creative fiction writers to write novels (Streitfeld, 2018). Besides supporting humans, 
such Natural Language Generation (NLG) algorithms can also autonomously create different 
types of texts. Already in use in the field of digital journalism, algorithms can generate news 
pieces based on standardized input data such as sports scores or stock market values (van Dalen, 
2012). However, autonomous creative text generation presents a bigger challenge as it requires 
the generation of original content that is deemed appealing and useful (Bakhshi, Frey, & 
Osborne, 2015). Hence, creative writing has long been considered a task impregnable for 
algorithms (Keith, 2012; Penrose, 1990). 
Yet, more recent developments in machine learning have expanded the scope and 
capacities of NLG (Jozefowicz, Vinyals, Schuster, Shazeer, & Wu, 2016). A notable case is the 
open-source algorithm called Generative Pre-Training 2 (GPT-2; Radford et al., 2019). At close 
to zero marginal cost, it produces text across a wide variety of domains, ranging from non-
fiction, like news pieces, to fiction, such as novels. The text outputs adhere to grammatical and 
semantical rules, and allegedly generally reaches human levels. Due to such claims about the 
unprecedented abilities and the potential ethical challenges it raises, for example as a tool for 
disinformation (Kreps & McCain, 2019), much controversy accompanied the algorithm’s release 
(The Guardian, 2019). However, systematic empirical examination of these claims is largely 
lacking – especially from an experimental social science perspective. In particular, it remains 
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unknown whether humans are able to reliably distinguish creative text that is generated by an 
algorithm from one written by a human, when they are incentivized to do so. Do people actually 
prefer creative text written by fellow humans over those generated by algorithms? Also, does the 
information about the respective origin – being a human or an algorithm – sway this preference 
for the creative text output? And does it make a difference whether humans are involved or not 
in the selection of the text output generated by the algorithm? To address these questions, we use 
incentivized paradigms to extend previous research into computational creativity by emphasizing 
the human behavioral reactions to NLG. While much research has been focused on the 
machinery – how algorithms can be programmed to write creative text (Boden, 2009; Gonçalo 
Oliveira, 2018; Oliveira, 2009) – research on humans’ behavioral reactions to such algorithms is 
much less pronounced.  
Distinguishing between Artificial and Human 
To gain empirical insights into people’s ability to discern artificial from real content, we 
draw on the famous Turing Test (Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012; Turing, 
1950). Based on a thought experiment, Turing proposed it as a way to find out whether machines 
can think. The basic set-up entails three agents: One judge and two participants. The judge seeks 
to find out which of the other two participants is a machine and which one is a human. In the 
classical version, the judge has five minutes to ask multiple questions and receives answers from 
the participants after which the judge indicates which of the two is a human and which one is a 
machine.  
Since its introduction, various algorithms have attempted to pass the test in multiple 
tournaments and competitions (see for an overview, Warwick & Shah, 2016). In 2014, a chat 
bot, called Eugene Goostman, was claimed to have passed the Turing Test, by tricking 33% of 
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human judges into believing that they were communicating with a 13 year old Ukrainian boy 
(Marcus, Rossi, & Veloso, 2016; Walsh, 2017; Warwick & Shah, 2016). Hence, a deceptive 
strategy of pretending to have rudimentary English proficiency paid off. Therefore, many 
scholars have criticized the standard Turing Test for rather identifying deceptive ability than 
intelligence (see for example, Riedl, 2014; Walsh, 2017). In pursuit for better measures of 
machine intelligence many extensions, modifications, and alternative tests have been proposed 
(see for an overview the special issue on the subject in AI magazine, Marcus et al., 2016). 
However, according to the results of a systematic literature review (see for more details 
SOM), no version of the Turing Test has contained financial incentives for judges’ accuracy. 
That is, judges typically do not receive any financial reward for successfully detecting the human 
among the competitors. Hence, it remains somewhat unknown whether people are unable, or 
might simply not be motivated, to differentiate human from machine counterparts. Filling this 
gap, we introduce a new version of the Turing Test that entails incentives for judges’ accuracy. 
In both studies, we tested the prediction that humans’ accuracy in correctly identifying whether 
the text is human-written or algorithmically generated does not exceed random guessing. 
Overconfidence about algorithmic detection 
Besides examining people’s actual ability to detect human from algorithmically 
generated text, it plays an important role to understand whether people have accurate beliefs 
about their own ability in that domain. Multiple studies have revealed overconfidence, hence the 
systematic overestimation of one’s own capabilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). While causing 
personal and social harm (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Moore & Healy, 2008), overconfidence in 
the domain of algorithm detection poses the threat of making people especially vulnerable to 
deception. That is, when people overestimate their own abilities to detect algorithmic behavior, 
 
CREATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE  6 
and in fact fail to reliably do so, they can fall prey to being influenced by algorithms without 
noticing it. To examine whether the commonly observed phenomenon of overconfidence also 
exists for algorithmic detection, we tested the hypothesis that people’s perceived ability to detect 
algorithms systematically exceeds their actual accuracy levels.  
Aversion and appreciation of artificial creativity 
Classically, machines have been seen as static rule-based systems. Since creativity 
requires the generation of original and useful ideas (Amabile, 1983), it was historically 
considered unfathomable that machines could be creative. In fact, creativity still provides a big 
obstacle for machines that merely rely on automation (Bakhshi et al., 2015). Yet, recent 
advances in machine learning (ML) have increasingly enabled computers to “‘learn’ and change 
their behaviour through search, optimisation, analysis or interaction, allowing them to discover 
new knowledge or create artefacts which exceed that of their human designers in specific 
contexts” (McCormack & D’Inverno, 2014; p. 2). Hence, algorithms become increasingly able to 
adapt, learn and create original, unpredictable outputs.  
ML has also changed the field of computational creativity (Boden, 2009; Loller-
Andersen & Gambäck, 2018; Majid al-Rifaie, Cropley, Cropley, & Bishop, 2016; Oliveira, 
2009; Sloman, 2012). Multiple algorithms have been developed to serve single creative purposes 
such as generating story narratives (Bringsjord & Ferrucci, 1999), craft jokes (Ritchie et al., 
2007) or write poetry (see for an overview, Oliveira, 2009). While these algorithms have been 
programmed with single purposes – e.g. creating poetry – recent developments in ML have 
rendered algorithms capable of text generation across various domains. The algorithm GPT-2, 
released in 2019 by OpenAI, is one of the most famous examples of such a robust text generating 
algorithm. In short, using ML technology, GPT-2 is a transformer-based language model, trained 
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on an unprecedentedly large data set, to predict the next word for a given textual input (see for 
more details on the algorithm, Radford et al., 2019). Due to these extensive training data sets, the 
algorithm has a more thorough ability to reproduce syntax and thus autonomously generate text, 
including new creative content.  
Yet, do human readers actually find such algorithmically-generated text equally (or 
more) appealing than human written creative text? And, do people’s preferences differ when 
they are aware (Transparency) vs. unaware (Opacity) about the algorithmic origin of the text? 
We thus experimentally examine how information about the algorithm shapes humans behavioral 
reactions – reflecting current directions in AI-safety research that deal with algorithmic 
transparency (Craglia et al., 2018; Garfinkel, Matthews, Shapiro, & Smith, 2017; Marcinkowski, 
Kieslich, Starke, & Lünich, 2020; Shin & Park, 2019). While transparency can refer to different 
types of disclosures around algorithmic decisions, here we focus on algorithmic presence, hence 
the disclosure about whether an algorithm is involved in the decision at all (Diakopoulos, 2016). 
It pertains to the current policy debate of whether people have a right to know when they deal 
with an algorithmic counterpart. For example, a proposed “Turing’s red flag law” (Walsh, 2016) 
states that “An autonomous system should be designed so that it is unlikely to be mistaken for 
anything besides an autonomous system, and should identify itself at the start of any interaction 
with another agent” (Walsh, 2016, p. 35). Requests for such transparent information regimes 
have become increasingly voiced in light of the recently published hyper-realistic phone call 
assistant GoogleDuplex (Leviathan & Matias, 2018), and robust text generation algorithms such 
as GPT-2 (The Guardian, 2019). 
When people are informed about algorithmic presence, extensive research reveals that 
people are generally averse towards algorithmic decision makers. This reluctance of “human 
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decision makers to use superior but imperfect algorithms” (Burton, Stein, & Jensen, 2019; p.1) 
has been referred to as algorithm aversion (Dietvorst, Simmons, & Massey, 2015). In part driven 
by the belief that human errors are random, while algorithmic errors are systematic (Highhouse, 
2008), people have shown resistance towards algorithms in various domains (see for a systematic 
literature review, Burton et al., 2019). For example, people dislike, machines making moral 
decisions (Bigman & Gray, 2018), especially when they appear eerily human (Laakasuo, 
Palomäki, & Köbis, 2019), devalue purely algorithmic political choices (Starke & Lünich, 2019), 
trust algorithms less than other humans (Dietvorst et al., 2015), and are even averse to relying on 
superior algorithmic recommendations about which jokes others would find funny (Yeomans, 
Shah, Mullainathan, & Kleinberg, 2019). 
When it comes to aversion towards algorithmically generated text, research within digital 
journalism has assessed people’s perceptions of news generated by algorithms (Carlson, 2015; 
Diakopoulos & Koliska, 2017). For example, companies like Automated Insights produce 
articles for the Associated Press in domains where information exists in standardized formats, 
such as finance, sports or weather. Experiments have compared people’s evaluations of such 
algorithmically generated news pieces with those written by journalist (Clerwall, 2014; Graefe, 
Haim, Haarmann, & Brosius, 2018; Sundar & Nass, 2001). In one study, participants judged, 
among other facets, the overall quality, credibility, and objectivity of the text. The results reveal 
that the algorithmically-generated content is rated as more descriptive and boring, while at the 
same time viewed as objective and not necessarily distinguishable from content written by 
journalists (Clerwall, 2014). Another online experiment assessing people’s perception of news 
pieces, systematically manipulated the articles’ actual and declared authors (Graefe et al., 2018). 
Assessing credibility, readability, and journalistic expertise of the stimuli revealed that 
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participants consistently favored the human-written articles. People thus reveal aversion towards 
algorithmically generated newspaper articles, i.e. non-fiction text. 
Yet, do they equally dislike algorithmically generated fiction, creative text? And does the 
information disclosure actually influence revealed preferences? Gaining answers to these 
questions bears relevance for understanding the advances in artificial creativity and gauging the 
potential impact algorithms might have for creative industries (Bakhshi et al., 2015). 
Understanding whether people like or dislike creative text written by an algorithm also provides 
insights into whether NLG algorithms could be used to deceive others into believing that the 
creative text stems from a human. That is, if people find the current output of algorithms like 
GPT-2 entirely unappealing the potential for ethical harm is less imminent. If, however, people 
find human and AI-written creative text comparably appealing this would open the door for AI 
being used to craft text on humans’ behalf.  
To find out whether people are averse to algorithmically generated creative texts, we 
assessed people’s revealed preference for algorithmically-generated creative text. From pairs of 
poems – each time one originated from an algorithm and the other from a human – participants  
picked one they liked more. Between subjects, we either disclosed the respective origin of the 
poem (Transparency) vs. not (Opacity). We differed the degree of proficiency on the side of the 
human writers: untrained novices in Study 1 and experts in Study 2 and compared their 
performance with the state of the art algorithm GPT-2. We tested the prediction that humans 
would prefer the human written poem, in particular when they were informed about the origin of 
the poem. Moreover, in Study 2 we additionally assessed stated preferences of algorithm 
aversion, by asking people how they generally perceive algorithms that write creative text. Here, 
we tested our prediction that stated and revealed preferences correlate positively.  
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Human selection in and out of the loop 
Moreover, the combination of understanding people’s detection accuracy of and 
preference for algorithmically generated text , enables new insights into the deceptive potential 
of NLG algorithms. That is, if people cannot tell the text apart, and do not systematically prefer 
humans over algorithms as authors of the creative text, then GPT-2 and other algorithms might 
indeed be used as a new form of plagiarism. One key feature to understand the deceptive 
potential of such algorithms is the degree of autonomy the algorithms have. Someone using the 
algorithm to craft text on one’s behalf can scan through the outputs – algorithms like GPT-2 are 
capable of creating multiple samples of text in mere seconds – and pick the one most suitable for 
a particular task. This reflects a selection process with humans-in-the-loop (Goldenfein, 2019). 
On the other end of the spectrum are unfiltered algorithmic outputs, such as many chatbots, 
tweetbots and other automated text-generating algorithms. These algorithms act autonomously. 
The selection process occurs with humans-out-of-the-loop. 
Previous research suggests that human involvement in algorithmic decision-making 
crucially shapes perceptions of identical outcomes (Starke & Lünich, 2019) and the degree of a 
machine’s autonomy drives moral evaluations of machines (Bigman, Waytz, Alterovitz, & Gray, 
2019). Yet, the behavioral reactions to these different regulation regimes remains largely 
unknown, in particular in relation to the NLG algorithms.. To gauge the creative abilities of such 
algorithms, it makes a big difference whether a human is in or out of the selection processes of 
the algorithm’s output. Therefore, we introduce a human-in-the-loop (HITL) and a human-out-of-
the-loop (HOTL) treatment. We tested the predictions that when it comes to algorithmic poetry 
people’s detection accuracy and revealed algorithm aversion drop when they read poems that 
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were preselected by humans (HITL) compared to when reading poems that were randomly 
picked from the outputs generated by GPT-2 (HOTL). 
General Method  
In two studies we incorporate established tournament designs from behavioral economics 
to computational creativity research by creating a competition between two agents and have an 
independent third party function as a judge (see for similar set-ups, Gneezy, Saccardo, & van 
Veldhuizen, 2019). Extending previous behavioral research, in which two humans have 
competed with each other (see for an overview, Camerer, 2011), in our experimental set-up 
humans directly compete with an AI-agent, in this case the text generating algorithm GPT-2. 
Both studies contain four parts (see for an overview Table, 1). Part 1 consists of creating 
pairs of human-AI poems. On the human side, in Study 1, poems were written by participants 
who took part in an incentivized real-effort creative writing task, while in Study 2, we used 
existing, professional poems. On the algorithm’s side, the poems stem from a state-of-the-art 
NLG algorithm GPT-2. In Study 1, we, the authors, selected from the text outputs that the 
algorithm generated. In Study 2, we introduced a between subjects manipulation of selection 
procedure, namely whether the poems entering the competition were again selected by the 
authors, hence Human-in-the-loop (HITL) versus randomly sampled from the text outputs that 
GPT-2 produced, hence Human-out-of-the-loop (HOTL). 
Part 2 entails a judgement task. In it, a separate sample of participants act as third-party 
judges and indicate their preference for the creative texts. In both studies, we manipulated 
between subjects whether participants received information about the origin of the text, i.e. 
which of the two poems was written by a human. Comparing the Transparency treatment, in 
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which participants were informed about the origin with the Opacity treatment, in which they 
were oblivious, enables us to gain causal insights how the information about algorithmic 
presence shapes revealed preferences. In Study 2, the selection manipulation of HITL vs. HOTL 
treatment additionally allows testing how human involvement in the selection procedure of the 
outputs of GPT-2 shape these preferences. 
Part 3 consists of an incentivized version of the classical Turing Test (Saygin et al., 2012; 
Turing, 1950) to assess people’s accuracy in identifying algorithmically-generated creative text. 
Judges naïve to the origin of the poems faced the task to correctly distinguish human-written 
from algorithmically-generated text. In contrast to the standard version, however, judges could 
not directly interact with the two participants by asking questions, but merely received the text 
output. As a second refinement, we introduced incentives for accuracy. That is, judges could 
earn €0,50 if they correctly identified the origin of the text. In Study 1, participants in the 
Opacity treatment engage in this version of the Turing test, while for Study 2 we recruited a 
separate sample of participants. Study 2 further contained the selection treatment to assess how 
human involvement in the selection procedure shapes people’s ability to differentiate human 
from algorithmically-generated creative text.  
As part 4, accompanying the accuracy assessment, participants indicated their confidence 
in their detection accuracy. In Study 1, this measurement was unincentivized, while in Study 2, 
we attached financial incentives for correctly estimating the performance. Namely, participants 
received a reward of €0.50 if they correctly indicated the number of rounds in which they 
identified the correct origin of the poem. This modification allows us to gauge how people’s 
estimated performance compares with their actual performance, and how incentives influence a 
potential gap between the two. 
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Pre-registration statement 
All studies reported in this manuscript are pre-registered on the Open Science 
Framework1, where we provide an overview of all hypotheses, pre-analysis plans, material, data 
and R analysis scripts for the analyses reported in the manuscript as well as additional tests. We 
further provide several accompanying documents that provide background information and 
technical details on the use of the NLG algorithm, the procedure employed to gather and select 
the poems for the competitions.  
  
                                                 
1 Pre-registration Study 1: https://osf.io/znjex  
Pre-registrations for both parts of Study 2: https://osf.io/z6fhr & https://osf.io/uvmjx 
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Table 1. Overview of two studies that each contain four parts.  
 Study 1 Study 2 
Part 1 – Selection of poems 
as stimulus material  
Poems written by untrained 
writers (N=30)  
vs.  
GPT-2 Medium (final poems 
selected with HITL)  
Professional poems (e.g. Maya 
Angelou) 
vs.  
GPT-2 Medium (between 
subjects treatment of final poems 
selected either with HITL or 
HOTL) 
Part 2 – Preference Participants (N=200) reveal 
preference for human vs AI 
poems (either while knowing the 
origin of the poem Transparency 
or not Opacity 
Participants (N=400) reveal 
preference for human vs AI 
poems (either while knowing the 
origin of the poem Transparency 
or not Opacity)  
Part 3 – Detection Accuracy Incentivized version of Turing 
Test among participants in 
Opacity (N =100), reward = 
€0.50 
Incentivized version of Turing 
Test with separate sample (N = 
200), reward = €0.50 
Part 4 – Confidence Unincentivized assessment of 
Confidence in detection ability  
Incentivized assessment of 
Confidence of detection ability 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Thirty participants (MAge = 29.40, SDAge = 8.75; female = 
56.67%) completed the task to write a poem and answering a few exit questions, which in total 
took on average around eleven minutes. To obtain high quality online data, we recruited the 
participants via the online research platform Prolific Academic (see for a discussion of different 
online research platforms, Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017), paid participants an 
average of €15,- per hour, and restricted the sample to be proficient in English. After providing 
informed consent, participants were informed about the incentivized competition that they would 
enter (see for full instructions SOM). Namely, they could win a prize of €2, when their text was 
chosen as the winner in the competition, which led to a total amount of bonuses paid out of €40.  
Part 1 – Selection of poems 
Human Competitor. To enter the competition, participants had to write a short piece of 
poetry for which they received the first two lines. Participants could freely decide on how to 
continue the poem, which had to be at least 8 lines long and be written in English. Instructions 
further explained to participants that they should abstain from (a) writing gibberish (e.g. 
kajsdkjasdkjaskjd), (b) address the judge directly (e.g. “choose me as the winner”), and (c) 
plagiarize other people's work as this would result in exclusion from the competition. Three 
independent blind coders screened the entries according to whether the written texts adhere to 
these criteria. We randomly picked 20 poems that fulfilled the pre-specified criteria. The 
instructions explained this procedure to the participants, who under the assumption that all 
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participants fulfilled the inclusion criteria, had a chance of 67 percent to enter the writing 
competition. 
AI competitor. The randomly picked poems written by participants entered a competition 
with poems written by GPT-2. Namely, for Study 1 we used the 345M model of GPT-2, which is 
the second model that OpenAI released (see for the code https://github.com/openai/gpt-2). Being 
trained to generate poems that abide by the above mentioned rules, GPT-2 received the same two 
starting lines. We trained GPT-2 for this specific writing task on a self-compiled data set 
consisting of works from various professional poets including Jane Campion, Roald Dahl, 
Robert Frost and William Blake. Adhering to recent suggestions to increase reproducibility in 
AI-research (Gibney, 2020), the full list is available on OSF, including a 1.1 MB text file 
containing a list of their collected works (retrieved from www.poemhunter.com). To imitate 
poetry, text written by GPT-2 further had to adhere to one of the pre-specified criteria to enter 
the writing competition. Namely, the poem had to use lines and verses, rhyme (end or begin 
rhyme, assonance), alliteration (words beginning with the same letter), onomatopoeia 
(phonetically imitating the sound of its meaning), rhythm, repetition, symbolism, or 
contradictions. The training data set as well as all samples (including those that did not enter the 
competition) are available on OSF. Among the GPT-2 written poems that qualified 10 poems 
were chosen for the competition and randomly matched with a human written poem.  
Part 2-4 – Preference, Detection Accuracy and Confidence 
Participants. Applying the same pre-selection criteria as in Stage 1, we recruited 200 
participants, again via the online research platform Prolific Academic.  Participants completed 
the task on average within 17 minutes, yielding a mean payoff of €11.67 per hour. Applying the 
pre-registered attention check, we excluded eight participants. All results reported in this 
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manuscript remain qualitatively unaffected by the exclusions. The final sample consisted of 192 
participants (MAge = 29.06, SDAge = 10.61; female = 39.1%, other/prefer not to indicate = 1%). 
Preference. Participants received instructions for the judgment task in which they took 
the role of the judge (see full instructions in SOM). As judges, they received ten pairs of poems 
all beginning with the same two opening lines. For each pair they had to indicate a winner 
according to which poem they personally liked better. They were informed that this choice had 
financial consequences as one of the ten comparisons would be paid out and the chosen winner 
would receive a prize of €2. Judges also received the information that in each pair, one poem 
stemmed from a human writer and the other poem stemmed from the algorithm GPT-2. To avoid 
efficiency concerns of judges seeking to reward the human writer, randomly chosen token 
players received the prize when the GPT-2-written poem won the competition. Namely, it was 
common knowledge to all participants that if GPT-2 won the pay-off relevant round, another 
randomly writer received the reward.  
Information Treatment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments: 
Transparency and Opacity. In the Transparency treatment, judges received information about the 
origin of the poems. Hence, for each pair they knew which poem was written by a human and 
which one was generated by GPT-2, prior to their decision to award a winner. In the Opacity 
treatment, judges did not receive this information about the respective origin. Although knowing 
that the pair of poems stemmed from a human writer and GPT-2, judges did not know which one 
is which. 
Detection Accuracy. Participants in the Opacity treatment, who were thus naïve to the 
origin, additionally engaged in an incentivized version of the Turing Test (Saygin et al., 2012; 
Turing, 1950). Akin to the original version proposed by Turing, judges faced the task to correctly 
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distinguish human from machine written text. In contrast to the standard version, however, 
judges could not directly interact with the two participants by asking questions, but merely 
received the text output. As a second refinement, we introduced incentives for accuracy. That is, 
judges could earn €0,50 if they correctly identified the origin of the poem. They received ten 
pairs of poems from which we randomly selected one for payment. After judging the ten pairs, 
participants in this treatment received the same poems and were asked to identify the to identify 
the true author. One of these competitions was randomly selected one for payment. 
Confidence. Judges also estimated their level of confidence in correctly identifying the 
human poem on a 100-point scale (0 = “not at all confident”; 100 = “very confident”). These 
subjective ratings of participant’s confidence were compared to the actual level of accuracy in 
determining the origin of the text. 
Results 
Part 1 – Selection of poems 
Human-written and GPT2-generated poems did not significantly differ in length as a 
sign-rank test on the number of words reveals (p = .824). Participants wrote a median of 37 
words (SD = 14.36) using eight lines (7.55), while GPT-2 generated a median of 40 words (SD = 
12.94), also using eight lines (7.75) on average. Thus, the poems were of similar length and 
could also not be distinguished visually or by other aesthetic rules. As outlined in the pre-
registration, we collected additional exploratory variables assessing the authors level of 
confidence in winning the competition and creativity ratings of the poems (see OSF). We report 
the results for these measures on OSF. 
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Part 2 – Preference 
Overall, human-written poems won 1091 out of 1915 competitions corresponding to a 
win share of 56.97 percent which significantly differs from a win-share of 50% (χ² = 37.23, p = 
<.001). Mixed effect probit regressions with random effects to account for dependencies of 
responses of individuals and per poem equally consistently reveal significant preferences for 
human-written vs. algorithmically-generated poems shown by a significant intercept in Models 
0-3 (see Table 2). Hence, overall judges showed a preference for human-written over 
algorithmically-generated poems. 
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Table 2. Mixed effect probit regressions predicting preference for the human written poem in 
each round.  
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV: Preference for human-
written poetry     
(Intercept) 0.18** (0.03) 
0.20** 
(0.04) 
0.22** 
(0.05) 
0.35* 
(0.16) 
Treatment 
 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 
  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Gender 
  -0.03 -0.04 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Education         
 Primary School    -0.34 (0.30) 
 High School    0.04 (0.07) 
 Master     0.12 (0.08) 
 PhD    0.09 (0.16) 
English Proficiency         
None    0.04 (0.29) 
Limited Working    -0.15 
   (0.18) 
Professional Working     -0.17    (0.16) 
Full Professional    -0.15 
   (0.17) Native or bilingual    -0.19 
   (0.17) 
N 1915 1915 1905 1905 
Note. Random effects included for the participants ID and the pair of poems. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. DV = Preference, binary variable across ten rounds coded as: 0 = preference for algorithmically-
generated poem; 1 = preference for human-written poem. Independent variables: Age (continuous, standardized), 
Gender(dummy, reference category = male), Education (dummy, reference category = Bachelor), Language: The 
Interagency Language Roundtable scale is used to determine the participants’ level of English with the reference 
category being elementary proficiency. Significance coding: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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As a first test of our hypothesis that people would be more averse to algorithmically-
generated poetry in the transparency treatment, we conducted a two-sample t-test with equal 
variances on the total number of rounds the human written poem was chosen. The analysis 
indicates no significant difference between the number of wins for the human agents in the 
Opacity (M = 5.59, SD = 1.49)  versus in the Transparency (M = 5.82, SD = 1.69) treatment 
(t(189) = 1.05, p = .29, see also Figure 1)2. As the assumption of normality of the aggregated 
wins was violated (Shapiro-Wilk: W = 0.96, p <.001), we additionally conducted a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test which similarly indicate no significant differences in preferences across 
treatments (mdnOpacity = mdnTransparency = 6, W = 4285, p = .39). Further, Bayesian independent 
samples t-tests analysis reveals a Bayes factor of BF0+ = 7.40, hence providing moderate support 
that the H0 of no differences between the treatments is more likely than the H1 of stronger 
preferences towards human-written poetry in the transparency treatment. Finally, we conducted  
mixed effect probit regressions predicting the binary outcome of preference in each round with 
random effects for the participant ID and poem pair. The results reveal no significant treatment 
differences, also when controlling for demographics and education levels (see Models 1-3, in 
Table 2). Taken together, these results suggest that, contrary to our hypothesis, judges did not 
prefer the human-written poetry more strongly when they were informed about the origin.  
  
                                                 
2 Conservative sensitivity analysis with α = .05, power of 1-β =.8 and 100 participants per treatment suggests that 
our analysis was able to detect a small effect (Cohen’s d = 0.39). 
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Figure 1. Violin plots of revealed preference for human-written poetry across information 
treatments. 
Note. The plot depicts the distribution of aggregated rounds in which the participants chose the 
human written poem across in the Transparency treatment (left pane) and Opacity treatment 
(right pane). Inside the violin plot mean and 95%confidence intervals are plotted, indicating a 
significant preference for human-written poems in both treatments, yet no differences across 
treatments. 
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Part 3 – Detection Accuracy 
Overall, judges identified the correct origin with an average accuracy of 50.21 percent 
(95%CI[46.4; 53.9]). To test our pre-registered conjecture, that judges’ accuracy levels in 
detecting the algorithmically-generated poem would not exceed random guessing, we conducted 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing judges’ performance with chance (= 50%)3. The results 
reveal that judges’ accuracy does not significantly differ from chance (V = 1479, p = .935). This 
result is further supported by Bayesian binomial test, yielding a Bayes Factor of BF01 = 24.91, 
and hence providing strong support that the H0 of judges’ accuracy not exceeding chance is more 
likely than the H1. We also conducted mixed effect probit regressions with random effects for the 
participant ID and the pair of poem, predicting the judges’ accuracy in each round. The results 
reveal no significant deviation from chance at detecting the correct poem, also when controlling 
for standard demographics of age, gender and education (see Table 3). Taken together, the 
results indicate that people are not reliably able to identify human versus algorithmic creative 
content.  
  
                                                 
3 Conservative sensitivity analysis with α = .05, power of 1-β =.8 and 100 participants and a normal parent 
distribution suggests that our analysis was able to detect a small effect (Cohen’s d = 0.28). 
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Table 3. Mixed effect probit regressions predicting accuracy of detecting the correct poem in 
each round. 
   Model 0  Model 1  Model 2  
DV: Detection Accuracy       
(Intercept) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
Age 
 0.02  
(0.05)  
0.05  
(0.06)   
Gender 
 -0.13  
(0.10)  
-0.19  
(0.10)   
Education 
    
    
High School 
    -0.04 
(0.11)      
Master  
    -0.01 
(0.15)      
PhD 
   -0.22 
(0.21)     
English Proficiency     
 None  
    *1.72 
(0.65)  
 Limited 
   0.45 
(0.31) 
 Professional Working  
  *0.62 
(0.29) 
 Full professional 
  0.33 
(0.28) 
 Native or bilingual  
    0.47 
(0.28) 
N 733 733 733 
Note. Random effects included for the participants ID and the pair of poems. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. DV = Detection Accuracy, binary variable across ten rounds coded as: 0 = incorrect guess; 
1 = accurate guess. Independent variables: Age (continuous, standardized), Gender(dummy, reference 
category = male), Education (dummy, reference category = Bachelor), Language: The Interagency 
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Language Roundtable scale is used to determine the participants’ level of English with the reference 
category being elementary proficiency. Significance coding: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
Part 4 – Confidence  
As non-pre-registered exploratory analyses, we examined judge’s level of confidence in 
detecting the correct origin, prior to having read any samples. On a scale from 0 to 100, the 
average confidence level of the judges was M = 62.27 (SD = 22.27), with the distribution being 
moderately left skewed (skewness = -0.496, SE = 0.09; see Figure 2, left pane). Hence, on 
aggregate people rate their confidence level higher than chance. Regression analysis between 
peoples’ confidence in differentiating human from GPT-2 written poems and their actual 
performance reveals no significant relationship (b < .01; β = .017, t(74) = 0.143, p = .887). 
Hence, self-rated confidence did not predict their actual performance. Moreover, we find that a 
significant proportion of participants (69.33%) reveals overconfidence, defined as confidence 
levels exceeding participants’ actual accuracy in their performance (see also Figure 2, right 
pane). Overall, these results provide a first tentative indication that people are not able to 
accurately predict, instead overestimate, how well they will perform in the incentivized Turing 
Test.  
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Figure 2. Density distribution of the judges’ confidence score ranging from 0 to 100% (left pane). 
Scatterplot illustrating the relationship between confidence and their actual standardized performance 
across all rounds of the incentivized version of the Turing Test (right pane).  
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Discussion 
Study 1 examined the behavioral responses to algorithmically generated creative text. 
The results reveal that judges slightly preferred human-written over algorithmically-generated 
poems, independent on whether they were cognizant (Transparency) or oblivious (Opacity) 
about the origin of the poem. This effect occurred even though their decisions had financial 
consequences for the authors. Moreover, in line with our expectations, judges were unable to 
reliably distinguish human from artificial poetry. In light of the financial rewards for accuracy in 
our version of the Turing Test, these results are among the first to indicate that detecting artificial 
text is not a matter of incentives but ability. At the same time, most judges’ confidence levels 
exceeded their actual performance in recognizing artificial poetry – a first sign of overconfidence 
in algorithm detection. 
Study 2 
One potential criticism of Study 1 states that the comparison favored the algorithm. 
Namely, poems created by novices competed with the output of a state-of-the-art algorithm 
trained on the works of prolific poets. Indeed, the recruited participants did not have any prior 
training in poetry writing and were put on the spot to write a poem within a short time frame. 
While algorithmically-generated poetry was able to pass as human, and people’s preferences did 
not change whether they were informed about the origin of the poem, it remains unknown what 
happens when trained, or even professional poets compete against an NLG algorithm. To address 
these questions, we drew on existing poems written by renowned professional poets such as 
Maya Angelou or Hermann Hesse (for a full list of poems see OSF), and let them enter the 
competition on the human side.  
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On the algorithm’s side we fed the full model of GPT-2 the first two lines of these 
professional poems to generate samples of poems. In the selection of the generated poems to 
enter into the competition, we introduced a new treatment, differing in the degree to which 
humans are involved. Ample AI-research points out that whether humans are involved in the 
decision chain has a crucial impact on the performance of the algorithm and on people’s 
evaluation of these outcomes (Rahwan, 2018; Schirner, Erdogmus, Chowdhury, & Padir, 2013; 
Starke & Lünich, 2019; Wang, Harper, & Zhu, 2020; Zhu, Yu, Halfaker, & Terveen, 2018). Yet 
behavioral reactions to these different regulation regimes remain largely unknown. Studying 
machine and human behavior means dealing with autonomous, unpredictable outcomes on the 
sides of the human and the machine (Rahwan et al., 2019). In our case the NLG algorithm GPT-
2 produces samples of different outcomes each time it is run. For the purpose of the current study 
this raises the important question: how to determine which of the various outputs, i.e. poems, that 
GPT-2 produces in a single run to use for the competition?  
Two main strategies can be applied. The first is human selection where humans pre-
screen and select the poem they deem most suitable, hence humans-in-the-loop (HITL). This 
reflects the situation in which someone uses GPT-2 as a writing aid and selects the output 
deemed most useful. The second is random selection, in the which the algorithmic output is 
randomly sampled and hence, enters the competition unfiltered, with humans-out-of-the-loop 
(HOTL). This selection procedure reflects unfiltered use of NLG algorithms such as for most 
tweet- or chat-bots. Using HITL vs. HOTL in the selection of poems this way, Study 2 provides 
some of the first answers whether and how much these different strategies for the selection of the 
algorithmically generated content affect people’s behavioral reactions. We thus again examined 
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people’s preferences, their accuracy of detecting algorithmically-generated text and their 
confidence levels of doing so. 
Method 
Part 1 - Selection of poems 
Human and AI competitor. We again created pairs of human vs. AI poems. As outlined 
in more detail in the documentation of the stimulus material (see helper file on OSF), the human-
written poems stem from a collection of poems written by professional poets, while the AI-
generated poems were generated using the full model of the open source NLG algorithm GPT-2. 
Akin to Study 1, GPT-2 received the same two starting lines of the existing poem and generated 
alternative endings to it. 
Selection treatment. As a new treatment we manipulated the way in which the 
algorithmically generated poem was selected. When letting GPT-2 XL generate text outputs it 
produces samples of multiple poems at once. As a between subjects manipulation, we 
manipulated how we determined which poem to choose from this sample (see more details on 
the selection procedure on OSF). In brief, in HITL treatment, the authors (NCK & LDM) 
selected the best poem by consensus voting from a collection of outputs generated by GPT-2. In 
the HOTL treatment, the poem to be entered in the competition was randomly chosen from the 
same output.  
Part 2 – Preference 
Participants and Procedure. For the poetry judgement task, we recruited a sample of 400 
participants, again via Prolific, in which we paid €1.98 for a study that took on average 16 
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minutes(= €8.40/hr). After applying the pre-registered exclusion criteria, we excluded 
participants who failed the attention check, leading to a final sample of 371 participants (Mage = 
31.38, SDage = 11.92, female = 47.14%, other/prefer not to say = 0.54%). After giving informed 
consent, participants received ten human-vs.AI poem pairs and, for each pair, picked the poem 
that they liked more. 
Information Treatment. Identical to Study 1, we again manipulated whether participants 
were informed about the origin of each poem. Hence in the Transparency treatment they 
received the information which poem was written by a human and which one was generated by 
an algorithm, while in the Opacity treatment they did not receive that information.  
Algorithm Aversion Scale. To assess stated algorithm aversion, we included a new item 
to an existing scale to measure algorithm aversion (Castelo, Bos, & Lehmann, 2019). The scale 
consists of multiple items each describing different tasks (e.g. “driving a car”), for which 
participants have to indicate who they trust more to execute that task. Answers are given on a 
100-point slider scale ranging from 0 (=a qualified human) to 100 (=an algorithm). To the list of 
existing items we included a new item that stated “Writing poetry”.   
Part 3 & 4 – Detection Accuracy & Confidence 
Participants and Procedure. To assess detection accuracy and confidence of detecting 
algorithmically-generated text, we recruited a separate sample of 200 participants via Prolific for 
a study that took on average 13.92 minutes and paid €2.26 (= €10.93/hr). After applying the pre-
registered exclusion criteria, the sample consisted of a total of 185 participants (MAge= 27.66; 
SDAge = 9.47, female = 47.02%).  
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Detection accuracy. Identical to Study 1, we used the incentivized version of the Turing 
Test in which people can receive a financial reward of €0.50 for correctly identifying whether a 
poem is human-written vs. AI-generated. 
Confidence. After participants completed the accuracy assessment, participants were 
asked to estimate in how many of the rounds they correctly identified the origin of the poem. We 
incentivized this elicitation of confidence by rewarding correct estimation of the number of 
rounds with a financial bonus of €0.50. We assessed the estimated performance after and not 
before participants completed the incentivized Turing Test to avoid hedging, i.e. participants 
changing their performance in the task to match their estimation.   
Knowledge of Poetry. After completing Parts 2-4, we assessed participants prior poetry 
knowledge. We presented the poems used in the study and asked two questions. First as a stated 
poetry knowledge assessment we asked the participants whether they had read the poem prior to 
participating in this study (Y/N). Second, as a measure of revealed knowledge, we asked them to 
impute the respective poet’s name. 
Demographics. Using the same questions as in Study 1, we again assessed standard 
demographic information of age, gender, education, as well as their experience with computer 
science, and their views on the development of general artificial intelligence at the end of the 
study. 
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Results 
Part 2 – Preference 
As a first test of the hypothesis, predicting that people would overall prefer the human 
written poem, we conducted a χ² tests to compare the expected win share of 50% differs from the 
observed win-share of human-written poems (64.90%), which suggested significant deviation 
from chance (χ²(1) = 340.82, p <.001). Similarly, a t-test with the expected value of 5 across all 
rounds which reveals that the observed number of rounds in which the AI-written poem is 
chosen (M = 3.51, SD = 1.64) is significantly lower than the expected 5, (t(383)= -17.73, p < 
.001). We further conducted mixed effect probit regression models with random effects for the 
participant ID and the poem pair. The results reveal  significant intercept in all models (see Table 
4) indicating a significant preference for human written poems which further corroborate this 
finding. Taken together, the results replicate results obtained in Study 1 and confirm our 
hypothesis that people overall reveal a preference for human-written poems over algorithmically-
generated poems. 
To test the pre-registered hypothesis that people reveal a stronger preference for human-
written poems in the Transparency treatment compared to the Opacity treatment, we conducted a 
two-sample t-test. A comparison of the mean of algorithmically chosen poems in the opaque (M 
= 6.41, SD = 1.82) vs. transparent condition (M = 6.58, SD = 1.42) suggests no significant 
differences (t(362) = 0.65, p = .52). Since a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality suggests that the 
assumption of normality is violated (W = 0.96, p <.0001), we additionally conducted a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank sum test which also indicates that median number of  rounds in which AI is chosen 
in the transparent condition (mdn = 6) does not exceed the median number of rounds in which 
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the AI poem is chosen in the opaque treatment (mdn = 7, W = 17961, p = 0.44). We further 
conducted mixed effect probit regressions predicting the binary preference measure in each 
round with random effects for the participant ID and the poem pair. The results reveal no 
significant differences for the information treatment dummy (see Models 1,3 & 4 in Table 4). 
Hence, contrary to our hypothesis, people did not reveal stronger preferences for human-written 
poems in the Transparency treatment compared to the Opacity treatment. 
As a first test of the hypothesis predicting that people reveal a stronger preference for 
human-written poems compared to AI-generated poems in the HITL treatment compared to the 
HOTL treatment we conducted a t-test. A comparison of the mean of AI chosen poems in the 
HOTL (M = 6.71, SD = 1.71) vs. HITL condition (M = 6.24, SD = 1.54) suggests significant 
differences (t(366) = -2.82, p = .005). A Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test also indicates that 
median number of rounds in which AI is chosen in the HITL treatment (mdn = 6) significantly 
exceeds the median number of rounds in which the AI poem is chosen in the HOTL treatment 
(mdn = 7; W = 14288, p = .006). These findings are corroborated by mixed effects probit 
regressions consistently revealing significant treatment differences of stronger preference for the 
human written poems in the HITL treatment compared to the HOTL treatment (see Selection 
treatment dummy in Models 2-4, Table 4). 
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Table 4. Mixed effect probit regressions predicting preference for the human written poem in 
each round.  
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DV: Preference for human-
written poetry     
 
(Intercept) 0.66*** (0.15) 
0.69*** 
(0.16) 
0.51*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
Information Treatment 
 -0.05  -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.08)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Selection Treatment 
  0.21*** **0.14 0.14*** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
Revealed Poetry Knowledge    -0.14 (0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
Age 
    0.08 
    (0.03) 
Gender  
     
     
 Male     -0.01 (0.05) 
 Other     0.59 (0.36) 
N 3840 3710 3710 3710 3710 
Note. Random effects included for the participants ID and the pair of poems. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. DV = Preference, binary variable across ten rounds coded as: 0 = preference for algorithmically-
generated poem; 1 = preference for human-written poem. Independent variables: Information treatment (dummy, 
reference category = Opacity), Selection treatment (dummy, reference category = HITL), Revealed Poetry 
Knowledge (continuous), Age (continuous, standardized), Gender (dummy, reference category = female).  
Significance coding: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Besides revealed preference for human written poetry, we additionally assessed stated 
algorithm aversion. The mean value of the algorithm aversion item assessing whether people 
prefer humans over algorithms to write poetry (M = 19.50, SD = 20.73), significantly deviates 
from the mid-point of the scale (t(383) = -28.83, p <.001), indicating a stated algorithm aversion 
to algorithmically generated poetry. As a first test of our hypothesis, predicting a positive 
correlation between the algorithm aversion towards AI writing poetry and the number of rounds 
the human-written poem was chosen, we conducted a point-biserial t-test. The results reveal a 
significant positive correlation, (t(382)=2.55, r = 0.11, p =.01). Mixed effect probit regressions 
similarly reveal a positive association between algorithm aversion and preferences for human-
written poems (b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, Z = 1.93, p = .05). The marginal effect is b = 0.06, SE = 
0.02, Z = – 2.55, p =.01), which remains significant when controlling for both treatments, 
knowledge of the poets and demographic information of gender and age (all bs > 0.5, ps < .03). 
Taken together we find evidence for a weak but significant link between stated algorithm 
aversion and revealed algorithm aversion in the domain of algorithmic poetry. 
Part 3 – Detection Accuracy 
As a first test of the hypothesis, stating that people’s accuracy in detecting the correct 
poem does not exceed chance levels, we conducted a one-sample t-test. We compare aggregated 
accuracy across all rounds to the expected value of 5 if people’s accuracy was at chance level of 
50%. Results of the t-test suggest that the average number of correct trials (M = 5.94, SD = 2.01) 
significantly exceeds the chance level of 5 (t(184) = 6.33, d = 0.47, p <.001). Since the 
assumption of normality is violated (Shapiro-Wilk: W = 0.967, p <.001), we additionally 
conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test which similarly indicates that the overall observed 
accuracy (mdn = 6) exceeds chance levels (V = 8406, r = 1.25, p < .001). We also conducted 
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mixed effect probit regressions with random effects for the participant ID and the poem pair 
predicting the accurate detection in each round. Results reveal a significant intercept when not 
including control variables (see Model 0, in Table 4). In sum, this finding suggests that overall 
participants are able to detect the correct origin at better than chance level.  
Table 5. Mixed effect probit regression predicting the accurate identification of the origin of the 
poem per round 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV: Detection Accuracy     
(Intercept) 0.26*** (0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
Selection Treatment 
     0.34*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Revealed Poetry Knowledge   0.62** (0.25) 
0.67** 
(0.25) 
Age 
   0.00 
   (0.04) 
Gender  
   -0.19* 
   (0.08) 
N 1850 1850 1850 1850 
Note. Random effects included for the participants ID and the pair of poems. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. DV = Detection Accuracy, binary variable across ten rounds coded as: 0 = incorrect guess; 
1 = accurate guess. Independent variables: Selection treatment (dummy, reference category = HITL), 
Revealed poetry knowledge (continuous) Age (continuous, standardized), Gender(dummy, reference 
category = female). Significance coding: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
As a first test of the hypothesis predicting higher accuracy levels in the HOTL treatment 
compared to the HITL treatment, we conducted a two-sample t-test, comparing the aggregate 
accuracy levels across all ten rounds. The results reveal that the mean accuracy levels in the 
HITL treatment are significantly lower (M = 5.37, SD = 1.95), than accuracy levels in the HOTL 
treatment (M = 6.55, SD = 1.90) (t(183)= -4.19, d = -0.62, p <.001). Due to violation of 
normality for both treatments (Ws > 0.958, ps < .002), we also conducted a Mann-Whitney test. 
The results indicate that the median number of correct rounds in the HITL treatment (mdn = 7) 
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exceeds the median correct rounds in the HOTL treatment (mdn = 5; U = 2872.5, r = -0.33;  p 
<.001). This finding is corroborated by mixed effect probit regressions which reveal significant 
treatment differences (see Models 1-3 in Table 5). Taken together, the results provide support for 
the predicted effect that people are better at detecting the author of the poem for randomly 
chosen poems generated by GPT-2 (HOTL) compared to human selected poems (HITL).  
Further, subgroup analyses reveal that while the accuracy rates in the HOTL treatment 
deviate significantly from chance (Student: t(88) =7.72, p < .001; WSR: Z = 2304, p < .001), in 
the HITL treatment accuracy levels do not (Student: t(95) = 1.83, p = .07, WSR: Z = 1820.5, p = 
.1, see also Figure 3). To further corroborate these subgroup effects, we conducted non pre-
registered Bayesian analysis. The results reveal extreme evidence that in the HOTL treatment 
people’s accuracy significantly deviates from chance (BF10 = 5.095e+8). Contrarily, in the HITL 
treatment, the results reveal anecdotal evidence in support of the null hypothesis that people are 
not better than chance to detect the correct origin (BF01 = 1.79). In line with that, subgroup 
analysis using mixed effect probit regressions suggest that people are better than chance at 
detecting the HOTL selected poems (b = 0.44, SE = 0.10, Z = 4.53, p <.001), while not deviating 
significantly from chance in the  HITL treatment (b = 0.10, SE = 0.09, Z  = 1.06, p = .26). These 
patterns remain robust when introducing control variables of demographics and knowledge of 
the respective poem (see Models 2 & 3, Table 5). Taken together, these findings support the 
prediction that people’s ability to detect the correct origin of the poem depends on the way the 
poem is selected. While people can tell apart professional poems from algorithmically-generated 
poems that are randomly chosen with a human-out-of-the-loop, they cannot reliably do so when 
these poems are selected by a human-in-the-loop. 
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Figure 3. Violin plots depicting the distribution of accurate rounds across the selection 
treatment.  
Note. The plot depicts the distribution of aggregated rounds in which the participants correctly 
identified the origin of the poem across in the Human-in-the-loop treatment (left pane) and 
Human-out-of-the-loop treatment (right pane). Inside the violin plot mean and 95%confidence 
intervals are plotted, indicating a significant ability of people to identify the correct origin only 
in the HOTL treatment preference for human-written poems in both treatments.  
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Part 4 – Confidence  
As a first exploration of overconfidence we again examined the distribution of 
confidence. On the scale of 0 to 10 the average confidence level of the judges was M = 5.99 (SD 
= 1.77), with the distribution slightly left skewed (skewness = 0.26, SE = 0.18 see Figure 4, left 
pane). Akin to Study 1, we assessed the percentage of people who overestimate their 
performance, calculating the difference score between confidence and accuracy and classifying 
those with a positive score as overconfident. This time we find that 38.91 percent of the 
participants are classified as overconfident. We ran a linear regression of confidence predicting 
accuracy levels to assess whether actual and believed performance correlated. The results 
indicate a significant positive relationship (b = 0.93, SE = 0.03, t(185) = 34.92, p < .0001, see 
Figure 4, right pane).  
To test the hypothesis, that participants’ estimated accuracy levels significantly exceeds 
their actual accuracy levels we conducted a one-sample t-test. Comparing the actual to the 
estimated performance (M = 5.60, SD = 1.77) reveals no significant differences (t(184) = -0.35, p 
= .64). Due to violation of normality (Shapiro-Wilk: W = 0.97, p <.001), we also conducted 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test which equally suggests no overall differences in observed and 
estimated performance (W = 17045, p = .95). Mixed effect linear regressions predicting 
overconfidence (i.e. confidence - accuracy), reveal no significant intercept, also when controlling 
for demographics and stated as well as revealed poetry knowledge (bs < 0.06, ps > .18). In 
concert, these results suggest that people overall do not show overconfidence and rather 
accurately estimate their ability to detect algorithmically generated poems.  
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Discussion 
Study 2 replicated two main findings observed in Study 1, and provides novel insights 
indicating that humans being in vs. out of the loop in the selection process of the poems crucially 
shapes both preferences and detection accuracy. First, the findings again reveal that people prefer 
human-written over algorithmically-generated poems, which is unswayed by the information 
about algorithmic presence, hence whether the origin of the poem was transparently 
communicated or opaquely revealed. As a second replication, people were again unable to 
reliably distinguish human from artificial poetry, while being incentivized to do so. However, 
this inability only occurred when humans were involved in the selection process (i.e. in the HITL 
treatment). When poems were randomly selected (i.e. in the HOTL treatment), people could 
detect the algorithmically-generated poem with higher than chance levels. Lending further 
credence to the importance of the selection procedure involved, the results, equally show 
significantly higher preference for algorithmically-generated poems when humans were involved 
Figure 4. Density distribution of the judges’ confidence score ranging from 0 to 10 (left pane). 
Scatterplot illustrating the relationship between people’s estimated (x-axis) and actual (y-axis) 
detection accuracy (right pane). The graphs plots linear regression slope as well as a slope with 
binomial smoothened estimates.  
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in the selection process. As some of the first insights into the behavioral responses to different 
levels of human involvement in the selection process of AI-generated content, the results show 
that humans being involved or not in the selection process strongly impacts the abilities of the 
algorithm.  
The results provide nuance to the link between estimated and actual algorithm detection 
accuracy. While in Study 1 participants’ unincentivized estimated performance significantly 
exceeded their actual performance, Study 2 elicited these estimations in an incentivized way. 
Contrary to the results of Study 1 and the hypothesis, the estimated performance did not 
significantly exceed actual performance and a positive link between detection accuracy and 
confidence therein existed.  
General Discussion 
Algorithms increasingly influence humans’ daily lives. Due to their growing learning 
abilities, autonomy and unpredictability in outcomes, it becomes pertinent to understand such 
machine behavior, and how it affects human behavior (Rahwan et al., 2019). The current set of 
studies contributes to this research by examining behavioral responses to the state-of-the-art 
NLG algorithm, GPT-2. Our results provide four main insights. First, while people reveal and 
state algorithm-aversion against artificial poetry, this aversive tendency does not increase when 
they are informed about the algorithmic origin of the text. These results bear special relevance 
when considering the second main insight: people reveal an apparent inability to reliability detect 
poetry that is generated by algorithms, although they are incentivized to do so and even when the 
algorithm competes with esteemed poets. Third, while overconfidence in the algorithm detection 
abilities exist when assessed in an unincentivized way (Study 1), no sign of systematic 
overconfidence exists when measured in an incentivized way (Study 2). Finally, the results of 
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Study 2 point towards the important role that humans play in the implementation of algorithmic 
outputs: humans involved in the process of selecting poems reduce revealed algorithm aversion 
and detection accuracy. In fact, when people are not involved in the selection process, accuracy 
does exceed chance levels. We discuss the implications of each of these insights in turn.  
Algorithm aversion and appreciation of algorithmic creativity 
Although first algorithms reach, and even surpass, human capacities in many narrow 
tasks, humans often show a general aversion towards adopting algorithms (Burton et al., 2019; 
Castelo et al., 2019; Dietvorst et al., 2015; Starke & Lünich, 2019). Contributing to current 
policy debates about transparency of algorithmic presence (Diakopoulos, 2016), our studies 
provide insights into the interplay of information and preferences for artificial vs. human text 
outputs. Contrary to our expectations, people reveal no stronger algorithm aversion when they 
are informed about the algorithmic origin of the text. Moreover, results of Study 2 allow linking 
such revealed behavioral preferences with stated preferences. Here, we find that people’s views 
on algorithms crafting poetry are strongly aversive. These views correlate consistently, but 
weakly with their behavior in choosing human poems over algorithmic poems.  
Our findings thus contribute to ongoing research seeking to disentangle when people are 
averse and when they are appreciative of algorithmic decision making. By now, multiple studies 
have examined people’s attitudes towards algorithmic decision making across various domains 
(Castelo et al., 2019; Lee, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2018). One key finding arising from that 
emerging literature is that people dislike algorithms to execute emotional (vs. mechanical) tasks. 
Hence, one interpretation of our results documenting aversion towards algorithmic poetry could 
stem from people viewing poetry as an emotionally charged task. We derive first support for that 
notion from our data collected using the existing algorithm aversion items. One of the original 
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items asked participants about their views about algorithms writing newspaper articles. 
Comparing the views on the items in which algorithms perform a language generation task – 
poetry and newspaper articles – reveals that people are significantly more approving of 
algorithms in the role of journalists rather than as poets (see full analysis in OSF). 
Distinguishing between Artificial and Human 
The question we brought to the online lab – are people actually able to distinguish 
artificial from human poetry – has attracted academic (Oliveira, 2009; Riedl, 2014) and public 
attention (Schwartz, 2015). For example, in a TED talk with more than 850k views, Oscar 
Schwartz compares poems by poets with generative poetry and based on his results claims that 
computers can indeed write poetry (Schwartz, 2015). Here, we extend such previous approaches 
in two fundamental ways. First, instead of using generative poetry algorithms that are 
specifically developed to merely write poetry, we use GPT-2, an algorithm more robust to 
different environments. The fact that although the algorithm is not specifically tailored to 
generate poetry, yet still manages to pass as a human writer, underlines the purported abilities of 
the algorithm in creating human-like texts (Radford et al., 2019).  
Second, we deviate from previous approaches by introducing financial incentives to a 
version of the Turing Test. This methodological feature of financially incentivizing choices is 
common in behavioral research using economic games and aims to reduce the measurement error 
by increasing people’s accuracy (Ariely & Norton, 2007). The results of both studies substantiate 
the view that differentiating between human-written and algorithm-generated poetry is not a 
matter of effort, but ability. Moreover, as we return to below, gaining a definite answer whether 
a computer can write poetry that passes as human depends on whether and how humans are 
involved in the process of selecting the output. 
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Confidence in algorithmic detection abilities 
Incentives also play a role for the question whether people systematically overestimate 
their own ability in detecting algorithmic poetry. While results of Study 1 using unincentivized 
confidence levels reveal that most of the participants overestimate their own abilities, results of 
Study 2 using incentivized measures of confidence paint a different picture: no evidence for 
systematic overconfidence and instead a positive relationship between ability and confidence. 
One way to interpret these differences is that in Study 1 participants “talked cheaply” and 
boasted their own perceived performance. Overconfidence is particularly pronounced in public 
settings where people can impress others (Ronay, Oostrom, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Van Vugt, 
2017). Since we assessed confidence in a private setting it is conceivable that participants in 
Study 1 overestimated their own performance to feel better about themselves and thus self-
deceive (van der Weele & Schwardmann, 2019).  
In Study 2, when incentives were attached to detecting the algorithmically-generated 
creative content people seemed to calibrate their responses, as their estimated and actual 
performance overall match well. This lack of overconfidence is remarkable in light of 
participants’ inexperience with the task. They were thus not able to draw on prior knowledge of 
their ability to detect algorithmic poetry, yet still able to provide informative estimates when 
reflecting on their own performance. Taken together, the results suggest that overconfidence in 
algorithm detection can be curbed by providing financial rewards so that people strive to 
accurately estimate their own performance. 
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Human selection in and out of the loop  
Our results suggest that computers can write poems that pass as human and that the 
poems are considerably appealing to readers, even when competing with the original work of 
professional writers. However, the results of Study 2 suggest that humans play an integral role in 
the process – only poems selected by humans successfully passed as human and lowered 
algorithm aversion. Hence, whether humans are in or out of the selection loop shaped people’s 
reactions to the algorithm’s performance. 
Thereby our experimental findings provide some of the first behavioral insights into 
people’s reactions to different human-in-the-loop systems, and complement a rich (technical) 
literature in AI research (Schirner et al., 2013). Seeking to mitigate the limitations of algorithms, 
such as racial or socio-economic biases (Crawford & Calo, 2016), human-in-the-loop systems 
have been proposed to increase algorithmic accountability (Wang et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2018) 
as keeping humans in the loop helps to monitor and adjust the system and its outcomes  
(Rahwan, 2018). Here, we show that humans in the loop also allow to harness the potential of 
recent developments in NLG, and crucially shape which conclusions about the machine’s 
behaviour are drawn. 
Implications and future research 
The results of the studies bear (ethical) implications. Language generation algorithms are 
entering daily lives. Using transfer learning, GPT-2 can be fine-tuned to craft text in other 
domains than poetry, such as online reviews, patent claims (Lee & Hsiang, 2019), or fake tweets 
(Ressmeyer, Masling, & Liao, 2019). Yet NLG can also be harnessed for good, such as 
providing useful feedback for customers (Budzianowski & Vulić, 2019) or even contribute to 
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curbing corruption, for example the Brazilian crowdsourced anti-corruption efforts Operação 
Serenata do Amor that uses a tweetbot to create public accountability (see https://serenata.ai/en/). 
NLG algorithms thus have potential but also perils. To contribute to a responsible use, future 
experimental studies examining how people react to algorithmically generated text in different 
domains will help to gain valuable empirical insights. 
Our framework contributes to the methodological toolkit to systematically study the 
impact of NLG algorithms on human behavior. To gain insights into the question whether people 
are even aware that they are consuming algorithmically generated text we propose an 
incentivized version of the Turing Test. Future studies could examine NLG’s abilities in other 
domains, such as automated news generation (Carlson, 2015; Diakopoulos & Koliska, 2017) or 
longer creative texts – providing insights whether algorithmically generated texts similarly 
passes as human in these domains. Studies seeking to study existing NLG algorithms face the 
challenge of dealing with unpredictable and changing text outputs. This leads to less 
experimental control when it comes to the machine’s behavior (Rahwan et al., 2019), yet 
provides new researchers degrees of freedom in stimulus selection. Our treatment comparing 
HITL and HOTL shows that this methodological choice can influence the results. Standardized 
selection protocols and open science practices (Srivastava, 2018) play an important role to gain 
reliable and reproducible findings on the nexus of human and machine behavior. 
Taking a step back and examining the overall pattern of results, we emphasize that the 
results do not indicate that machines are “creative”. In fact, one of the main functions of 
creativity in general and poetry in particular is the expression of (deep) emotions, a feat that 
machines lack (so far). The results are rather testament for the increasing abilities of NLG 
algorithms to create text that mimics human creative text and that people do find appealing. It is 
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widely assumed that algorithms such as GPT-2 have a long way to go before they can 
autonomously write truly creative text, especially in longer forms than poems. However, projects 
in which humans and algorithms form hybrid writing teams and collaboratively craft fiction text 
present one way in which such algorithms could enter our daily life. It however remains unclear 
whether such forms of hybrid collaborations between human and machines should be considered 
plagiarism or conversely to what extend the (developer of the) algorithm deserves (financial) 
credit for textual outputs. Related to the set-up used in the current studies, would an entry to an 
actual poetry competition by a contestant who uses GPT-2 input be counted as fraud? If so, how 
could it be detected? And if not, (how) should the prize money be split?  
Conclusion 
Algorithms that generate text that resembles human language become ever more widely 
accessible. By now, not only novelists with a writer’s block can make use of freely available 
algorithms like GPT-2. Understanding humans’ behavioral reactions to such algorithms helps to 
shape policies that ensure that artificial intelligence remains beneficial and ethical (Crawford & 
Calo, 2016). As a step in that direction, the present set of studies adopts a behavioral social 
science approach to examine creative artificial intelligence. We hope that more studies follow 
suit to inform policies of disclosure of algorithmic presence and provide new behavioral insights 
into human versus (creative) artificial intelligence. 
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